voisine v united states, 136 s ct 2272 2016

The use of physical force does not include crimes involving purely reckless conduct. Dictionaries consistently define the noun use to mean the act of employing something. 17A, 207(1)(A) (2006). It imposes a lifetime ban on gun ownership for a single intentional nonconsensual touching of a family member. We then determined that the knowing or intentional application of [such] force is a use of force. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13). . The term "misdemeanor crime of violence" is defined statutorily, in relevant part, as a misdemeanor that "has, as an . See id. at 69. Petitioner Stephen Voisine pleaded guilty to assaulting his girlfriend in violation of 207 of the Maine Criminal Code, which makes it a misdemeanor to intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[] bodily injury to another. Section 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)s prohibitions also include the threatened use of a deadly weapon. In that neighboring prohibition, use most naturally means active employment of the weapon. The Courts decision will affect the ability of misdemeanants to possess firearms and the health and safety of domestic violence victims. This is obviously not the correct reading of 922(g)(9). Federal law prohibits any person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm. 3942 (5th ed. . See Tr. See Brief for Petitioners 1822. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (to use means [t]o convert to ones service, to employ, [or] to avail oneself of); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993) (to use means [t]o convert to ones service or to employ); Astor v. Merritt, 111 U.S. 202, 213 (1884) (to use means to employ [or] to derive service from). In Voisines view, this results in more arrests, prosecutions, and convictions of people involved in minor domestic disputes. at 2325. of physical force" committed by a person in certain domestic relationships with the victim. The person has no desire to injure his friend, but he knows that the move is so dangerous that he is practically certain his friend will be injured. 78 United States. A few years later, law enforcement officers searched Armstrongs home as part of a narcotics investigation. See Hall, Assault and Battery by the Reckless Motorist, 31 J. Crim. Today the majority expands 922(g)(9)s sweep into patently unconstitutional territory. Even assuming any doubt remains over the reading of use of physical force, the majority errs by reading the statute in a way that creates serious constitutional problems. We granted certiorari, 577 U.S. ___ (2015), to resolve a Circuit split over whether a misdemeanor conviction for recklessly assaulting a domestic relation disqualifies an individual from possessing a gun under 922(g)(9).2 We now affirm. NOTE:Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. Then, as now, a significant majority of jurisdictions34 States plus the District of Columbiadefined such misdemeanor offenses to include the reckless infliction of bodily harm. We treat no other constitutional right so cavalierly. All we say here is that Leocals exclusion of accidental conduct from a definition hinging on the use of force is in no way inconsistent with our inclusion of reckless conduct in a similarly worded provision. In Castleman, we initially held that the word force in 921(a)(33)(A) bears its common-law meaning, and so is broad enough to include offensive touching. 644:11 (2007); Va. Code Ann. Three features of 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) establish that the use of physical force requires intentional conduct. 1999). People who didn't like the outcome of Vinson hoped that it would be reversed by the Supreme Court in Voisine v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 94, 98C (2014); Minn. Stat. See, e.g., Seaton, 385 S.W.3d, at 8990; see also People v. Grenier, 250 App. The majoritys examples are only those in which a person has intentionally used force, meaning that the person acts with purpose or knowledge that force is involved. The Angry Plate Throwerunlike the Soapy-Handed Husband or Chivalrous Door Holderhas engaged in a volitional act, even if he did not intend to hurl the plate at his wife. Stephen Voisine was convicted under Maines domestic assault statute, which criminalizes the intentional, knowing, or reckless causation of bodily injury or offensive physical contract to another person. Voisine was then convicted under section 922. Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 1987) (act of employing, using, or putting into service); Blacks Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. VOISINE v. UNITED STATES778 F.3d 176, affirmed. . The Court should assume that, absent a contrary textual indication, Congress legislated against this common-law backdrop. . Principles of lenity are inapplicable, because the common-law definition of battery, which includes reckless conduct, clearly applies. The Second Amendment protects the right of the people to keep and bear Arms. In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624, 627, 635 (2008), the Court held that the Amendment protects the right of all law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms that are in common use for traditionally lawful purposes, including self-defense. . The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence contends that Congress instituted this zero tolerance policy because of a lethal link between domestic abuse and firearm possession. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 8A, p.15 (1965) (defining intentional acts). The United States Supreme Court recently decided a case about what counts as a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" for purposes of the federal statute prohibiting individuals who have been convicted of such crimes from possessing firearms. 2) (2d ed. Each petitioner then entered a guilty plea conditioned on the right to appeal the District Courts ruling. . . A person could also create a force negligently or blamelessly. Congress defined that phrase to include crimes that necessarily involve the use . Please include what you were doing when this page came up and the Cloudflare Ray ID found at the bottom of this page. 2016). . 2d 736 Stephen L. VOISINE and William E. Armstrong, III, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES. The issue before us is whether 922(g)(9) applies to reckless assaults, as it does to knowing or intentional ones. See id. But many perpetrators of domestic violence are charged with misdemeanors rather than felonies, notwithstanding the harmfulness of their conduct. Voisine v. United States, USSC No. They argue that a broad reading will best protect the health and safety of domestic violence victims, and best reflect the intent of Congress. See, e.g., Ala. Code. But that fails to appreciate the distinction between intentional and reckless conduct. See id.at 48. The Court . Rev. And by that time, a substantial majority of jurisdictions, following the Model Penal Codes lead, had abandoned the common laws approach to mens rea in drafting and interpreting their assault and battery statutes. The court relied on statutory interpretation and the legislative history of section 922 to conclude that domestic assault, as defined by Maine law, was a use of physical force. And as we have shown, 921(a)(33)(A) plainly encompasses reckless assaults. United States v. Ossana, 638 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. Me. . Further, Congress enacted 922(g)(9) in order to prohibit domestic abusers convicted under run-of-the-mill misdemeanor assault and battery laws from possessing guns. In targeting those laws, Congress thus must have known it was sweeping in some persons who had engaged in reckless conduct. 922(g)(9) (section 922), to prohibit domestic abusers from obtaining firearms. Rev. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952); Model Penal Code 2.02, Comment 1, at 230. As a result, the majority overlooks the critical distinction between conduct that is intended to cause harm and conduct that is not intended to cause harm. The Angry Plate Thrower has used force against the plate, and the Door Slammer has used force against the door. . In the majoritys view, a husband who loses his grip on a plate or a boyfriend who lets the door slip has not engaged in a volitional act creating force. . . And the requirement of a practical certainty reflects that, in ordinary life, people rarely have perfect certitude of the facts that they know. But as the probability decreases, the actors conduct loses the character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness. Restatement (Second) of Torts 8A, Comment b, at 15. THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS, AND THE SCOPE OF THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT. 2272 195 L.Ed.2d 736. But others suggest that Congress intended to give the amendment narrow effect, and that a broad reading may affect the Second Amendment rights of the least violent offenders. See Castleman, 572 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). See id.at 190191, 202. 2 Voisine v. Section 922(g)(9) does far more than close [a] dangerous loophole by prohibiting individuals who had committed felony domestic violence from possessing guns simply because they pleaded guilty to misdemeanors. See Me. The Court answered this question in Voisine v. United States (136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016)). But the law will not impute that intent from merely reckless conduct. The relevant text thus supports prohibiting petitioners, and others with similar criminal records, from possessing firearms. Both men argued that they were not subject to 922(g)(9)s prohibition because their prior convictions (as the Government conceded) could have been based on reckless, rather than knowing or intentional, conduct. 1990) ([a]ct of employing, application).3 On that common understanding, the force involved in a qualifying assault must be volitional; an involuntary motion, even a powerful one, is not naturally described as an active employment of force. Ibid. 6 Petitioners make two last arguments for reading 921(a)(33)(A) their way, but they do not persuade us. Thus, the majority is left misapplying basic principles of criminal law to rationalize why all assault under the Model Penal Code constitutes the use of physical force under 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). 1027 (Mar. 14-10154. In States where the Model Penal Code has influence, reckless assault includes any recklessly caused physical injury. . Argued February 29, 2016Decided June 27, 2016 In an effort to "close [a] dangerous loophole" in the gun control laws, United States v. To limit its definition of use, the majority adds two additional requirements. purpose. 19 Oxford English Dictionary 350 (2d ed. See id. Plenty of States still criminalize libel. See Castleman, 572 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 13) ([T]he word use conveys the idea that the thing used (here, physical force) has been made the users instrument (some internal quotation marks omitted)). , Stephen L. Voisine and William E. Armstrong, III at 17. We hold that they do. These portions of the majoritys analysis conflate volitional conduct with intentional mens rea and misapprehends the relevant meaning of an accident.. 5) (2d ed. The Court concluded Congress incorporated the common-law meaning of forcenamely, offensive touching in section 921. Gen. Laws, ch. of physical force against the person or property of another. 18 U.S.C. 16. A reckless wrong is not: While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. Id., 500, Comment f, at 590. Judgment: Affirmed, 6-2, in an opinion by Justice Kagan on June 27, 2016. The United States maintains that Congress could have easily defined misdemeanor crime of domestic violence by incorporating a previously set definition for the phrase crime of violence but chose not to. See 778 F. 3d 176, 177 (2015). Supreme Court of United States. Regardless,Voisine maintains that principles of lenityapplied when a criminal statute is so ambiguous that the Court must make a guess at Congresss intentdemand resolution of ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant. Thus, where a person acts in a violent and patently unjustified manner, the law will often impute that the actor intended to cause the injury resulting from his conduct, even if he actually intended to direct his use of force elsewhere. Congress was worried that family members were abusing other family members through acts of violence and keeping their guns by pleading down to misdemeanors. 1011 (counsel for petitioners acknowledging that this example involves the use of physical force). All the more so here, where petitioners view would jeopardize 922(g)(9)s force in several times that many. Ibid. Ann., Tit. Also, no-drop policies allow prosecutors to proceed in domestic dispute cases without the victim present in court and willing to testify. And the state-law backdrop to that provision, which included misdemeanor assault statutes covering reckless conduct in a significant majority of jurisdictions, indicates that Congress meant just what it said. So in the 35 jurisdictions like Maine, petitioners reading risks allowing domestic abusers of all mental states to evade 922(g)(9)s firearms ban. 2. For purposes of comparison, to commit an assault knowingly or intentionally (the latter, to add yet another adverb, sometimes called purposefully) is to act with another state of mind respecting that acts consequencesin the first case, to be aware that [harm] is practically certain and, in the second, to have that result as a conscious object. Model Penal Code 2.02 (2)(a)(b); Me. 2272 (2016), nor United States v. Fogg, 836 FD.3d 951 (2016), considered whether a conviction under a statute that also criminalizes reckless driving was categorically a crime of violence under the Guidelines. 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Supreme Court of the United States Accordingly, Congress added 922(g)(9) to prohibit any person convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing any gun or ammunition with a connection to interstate commerce.
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